The international dictionary of intellectual historians: intellectual history in a global age by Schneider, Ulrich Johannes
143
Copyright 2005 by Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
Intellectual History in a
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Ulrich Johannes Schneider
This paper sets out a particular concept of intellectual history for discus-
sion and debate concerning the guidelines for our project for the International
Dictionary of Intellectual Historians. First let me advance the idea that intel-
lectual history is written everywhere, not only in West European countries,
where it emerged, but in East European countries, too, and second that it really
is a concept that applies not just to Europe alone but to the whole world, al-
though this suggestion will vastly complicate our notions of intellectual his-
tory.
There are many forms and methods of writing intellectual history, and a
variety of subjects as well. The context in which Masao Maruyama describes
ideology is quite different from that in which Michel Foucault constructs his
epistemological periods. Cheikh Anta Diop has a very different view of Greek
heritage from Anneliese Maier in her work on medieval science. Yet our project
requires that, despite the disparity in the writing of intellectual history, we must
entertain the notion of a great tradition. If we did not actually start the tradition,
we—the restricted Western “we”—have been the first to make it an object of
study; and now we—the expanded global “we”—continue to modify and to
diversify this tradition. Every new book confirms and also changes ways of
writing and explaining, arguing and understanding, learning and teaching in-
These essays are taken from contributions made to a conference held in Wolfenbüttel de-
voted to the background of the new International Dictionary of Intellectual Historians, edited
by Ulrich Johannes Schneider and Donald R. Kelley and supported in part by this journal. Pro-
fessor Schneider describes the current state of this project, and this is followed by essays by four
editors of the JHI.
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tellectual history. As individuals we probably would never be tempted to view
the field in such a broad perspective, but we must do this for present purposes,
which are to compile an international dictionary of intellectual historians.
While this project is still in creation, some concrete evidence is available
on our website (http://idih.hab.de), where you can find quotations defining in-
tellectual history and providing sample articles on four intellectual historians,
in fact the same ones mentioned above, namely, the German historian of sci-
ence Anneliese Maier, the Senegalese philosopher Cheikh Anta Diop, the Japa-
nese political thinker Masao Maruyama, and the French intellectual historian
Michel Foucault. There is also a database of nearly 800 head entries, which
includes historians from more than 30 disciplines and from more than 60 coun-
tries, all eventually to be complemented with articles.
It has taken us some years to bring the project to its present state. It is not
only a problem of funding, which has been provided so far on a modest level by
the Journal of the History of Ideas, the Foundation for Intellectual History in
London, the Sarasin Bank in Geneva, and the Herzog August Bibliothek in
Wolfenbüttel; for there are intellectual difficulties as well. How can we define
intellectual history, or (closer to the project’s immediate purpose) what is an
intellectual historian? The projected dictionary must have some guidelines,
and yet these criteria are not easy to establish. Because the aim is to produce a
book (as well as an online database), we have to think in practical terms and
determine where our curiosity will end. With the dictionary project we auto-
matically imply that intellectual history is written everywhere. Given the obvi-
ous disparity of the texts grouped together under this name—especially if we
globalize our attention—how can we be sure we can call all those already in-
cluded “intellectual historians”?
To the question “What is an Intellectual Historian?” the obvious answer is:
an intellectual historian is somebody who writes what we call intellectual his-
tory. Conversely, intellectual history is what we find intellectual historians do-
ing. Essentially, intellectual history is a literary activity, and an intellectual
historian is somebody producing an understanding by writing books.
Intellectual History as Invention
Let us begin with a brief look at Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the leading phi-
losophers of late nineteenth-century German culture, who devoted a major part
of his later work to historiography and historical thought. Before his death in
1911, Dilthey also produced histories of early modern European culture, sev-
enteenth-century belief systems, anthropological thought, and the origins of
hermeneutics, to mention just a few. His very last work remained a fragment,
”The construction of the historical world in the human sciences” (Der Aufbau
der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften), in which he raises many
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problems of historical understanding and considers their paradoxical and seem-
ingly insoluble nature.
Jürgen Habermas turned to Dilthey for guidance in his 1968 book on Knowl-
edge and Human Interests (Erkenntnis und Interesse), and pointed out the dia-
lectical character of the hermeneutical disciplines, the “Geisteswissenschaften.”
In one problematical sentence Dilthey writes, “We are first of all historical
beings, before we become observers of history” (Wir sind zuerst geschichtliche
Wesen, bevor wir zu Betrachtern der Geschichte werden).1 History writing is a
reflection on our being: it brings out the essence of what we are and articulates
our very being through history itself.
Nobody will miss the Hegelian overtones of this sentence, which portrays
the historian as a servant of the “world spirit,” operating an understanding which
is intellectually reliving in retrospect the objective process of becoming and
transforming “in reality.” Dilthey struggled with the cognitive side of histori-
ography, which he saw as recreating an experience which has already been
experienced. Luther’s Reformation, the English and the French Revolutions,
and the Napoleonic wars were all history before they became the subject of
contemplation, a history which “made” us before we could understand and
describe it.
Today, we may think of our own experience of 1989, the fall of the Berlin
wall: who could say that he or she had an understanding of the new world
which formed itself at that point in time? To view historical writing as reflec-
tions upon real events seems to be a fairly general assumption; but I do not
think we can shape our theories about historical writing in the way Dilthey
did—and least of all our definition of intellectual history.
Dilthey is fascinating to read because he does not hide the problems he
confronts in rethinking historical understanding. He is not suggesting anything
to his readers as others have done in talking about history, like Oswald Spengler
or Harold Bloom. Dilthey realized very well that there is a construction under-
lying historical reflection, which he calls “logical subjects” (logische Subjekte)
and which every historian has to create in order to achieve some meaningful
understanding. Logical subjects are concepts like “people,” “reason,” “progress,”
and “enlightenment,” which we see at work while writing histories. There is a
link between Dilthey’s post-Hegelian notion of historical cognition as reflec-
tion and the post-Kantian constructivism expressed in his belief that historians
cannot stick to fact and experience alone but must invent logical subjects as
historical agents.
This link reenforces the identity between the object of the history, what it
is written about, and the subject of the historian, where he or she is writing
1 Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften (Frank-
furt am Main, 1970), 346.
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from; for both belong to some great “we” which makes historiography a readily
consumed product. Historical writing in Dilthey’s sense is always expected; it
may be perhaps surprising, it is certainly enriching, but it always also satisfies
a higher need of a greater community of readers who share the experience of
which the written history is an authentic part.
Intellectual history is much more than this. One whom we call an intellec-
tual historian is a figure quite different from Dilthey’s historian, satisfying a
higher need of communal understanding. First of all, writing intellectual his-
tory does not mean recapitulating something which has or even could have
been experienced before, it is rather inventing the very object which estab-
lishes history. Think of the many ways of reinventing the Enlightenment, from
early nineteenth-century idealistic condemnation as moralistic reasoning to its
late nineteenth-century neo-Kantian appreciation, from the anti-religious sen-
timent in Paul Hazard to the intense fascination with religion described re-
cently by Martin Mulsow or Jonathan Israel, from its identification with scien-
tific thinking in Ernst Cassirer to the questioning of its disciplinary structure
by Michel Foucault, and so on.2
In reality there is no Enlightenment, but only the construction of histori-
ans. The same is true for many other “realities” assumed to be at work. In the
course of time concepts like Aristotelianism, Protestantism, Liberalism, and
Pragmatism mean nothing if there is not first a proper historical description.
Thus the primary characteristic of intellectual history is essentially its ability
to invent concepts, secondly, its orientation towards the future rather than the
past.
The works of intellectual historians must convince their audience of the
importance of their subject rather than pleading their own case within a given
set of values. Think of the many recent studies about the religious—or at least
confessional and denominational—contexts of modern scientific thought, from
Pietro Redondi’s study of Galileo to André Robinet’s essay on Leibniz’s church
politics.3 Think of the recent “discovery” of philosophical eclecticism in sev-
enteenth- and eighteenth-century thought, or of consumerism as a feature of
early modern culture. The same may be said of new models for the relationship
between European cultures and cultures from colonized countries, new ways
of acknowledging the importance of images in the tradition of knowledge, ques-
tions of interpretation, a renewed interest in teaching practices, canon forma-
tion, and so on.
2 Cf. Paul Hazard, La crise de la conscience européenne 1680-1715 (Paris, 1961; The Eu-
ropean Mind: The Critical Years 1680-1715 [New York, 1990]); Martin Mulsow, Moderne aus
dem Untergrund. Radikale Frühaufklärung in Deutschland 1680-1720 (Hamburg, 2002); Jonathan
Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity (Oxford, 2001).
3 Cf. Pietro Redondi, Galileo Heretic (Princeton, 1987); André Robinet, G. W. Leibniz, Le
meilleur du monde par la balance de l’Europe (Paris, 1994).
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New Approaches to Intellectual History
When an international group of scholars founded the “International Soci-
ety for Intellectual History” in 1994 in London, they discussed new approaches
to their field of study. Edited by Constance Blackwell in the first issue of Intel-
lectual News (1996), these statements are still worth reading. They betray an
important moment in reflection upon studies in intellectual history and they
reveal a new enthusiasm for it. “L’histoire intellectuelle ... ne se limite pas à
quelques phares,” Françoise Waquet says in her essay,4 and insists that intellec-
tual history includes second and third degree authors, because it focuses on the
penetration of ideas as well as their production. She also says that intellectual
history is international or at least supra-national, because ideas do not stop at
frontiers.
This seems a truism now, but it contains much of the revolutionary power
conveyed ten years ago with a new conception of the complexity of our intel-
lectual past. Scholars like Waquet in France, Anthony Grafton in the United
States, Helmut Zedelmaier in Germany, and Giovanni Santinello in Italy, to
name but a few, have provoked important changes in understanding intellec-
tual history by deviating from the canonical figures in the history of philoso-
phy, in political thought, in science, in literature, and in culture. They also
show an acute awareness of the interconnectedness of ideas, problems, and
ways of dealing with them.
We may conclude that a very good reason to undertake intellectual history
is to escape the narrowness of disciplinary histories. This is even true of some
who by design stuck to the canon, like Richard Popkin in the United States or
Merab Mamarda√vili in the Soviet Union, whose work effectively recon-
ceptualized the canon with which they started in the first place—with impor-
tant for both the canon of the history of philosophy.
The wish to move beyond the disciplines of traditional historical investiga-
tion, or at least to broaden them, addresses questions of context, of situation,
and of the conditions for intellectual production. In his 1994 statement An-
thony Pagden is rather wary of giving his full support to any truly new idea of
what intellectual history is all about, but he concedes a change. He says that a
“more broadly conceived Intellectual History” has recently developed, “even
if, at present, only as a modified form of one or another of the older more
established areas of inquiry: as an extension of the history of political thought
or of literary studies, the history of science or of art or music, and so on.”5 The
4 Françoise Waquet, “Histoire des relations intellectuelles dans la République des Lettres,”
Intellectual News, 1 (1996), 9.
5 Anthony Pagden, “The Rise and Decline of Intellectual History,” Intellectual News, 1
(1996), 15.
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question as to why the urge to broaden historical investigations emerged was
then answered in part by Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, who pointed to the
necessity of international and interdisciplinary research when dealing with early
periods of the European cultures. He says that the interest in an truly interna-
tional intellectual history arose from work done on early modern European
history, because national classifications established in the nineteenth century
were not useful for the history of scholarship, of erudition, and of the republic
of letters.6 Thus we can state that a second reason for intellectual history is the
development of new areas of research, especially in the period before 1800.
I would like to add a third aspect to the two already stated, that is, the
inventive character of intellectual history and its transdisciplinary nature. This
third aspect is particularly attractive to contemporary scholars doing historical
research in a variety of disciplines and attending to the practical side of intel-
lectual activities. Still quoting from the first issue of Intellectual News, we find
Edoardo Tortarolo saying that “Intellectual historians ... are in the first place
interested in the relationship between texts and worlds of experience.”7 His
words pinpoint the essence of the new enthusiasm for intellectual history which
opens closed spaces of dogmatic ideas and traditions to complex worlds of
scholarly action. Nicholas Jardine, a trained historian of science, is even more
specific: “We should try to discover the ‘scenes’ of past inquiries, the ranges of
issues that were both real for, and thought worth pursuing by, past philoso-
phers, historians, lawyers, medics, etc.”8
For the sake of simplicity, I want to characterize the traditional “history of
ideas” as the attempt to reduce complex situations of intellectual activity to a
few central ideas. In contrast the new intellectual history includes the many
diverse dimensions surrounding those ideas in order to move beyond theoreti-
cal understanding to an understanding of historical context and experience.
Christia Mercer’s recent book on the young Leibniz and his teachers is a
good example of an effectively broadened perspective on intellectual develop-
ments. More generally speaking, intellectual history becomes a new discipline
precisely at the crossroads of other disciplines, especially, the history of sci-
ence, philosophy, literature, religion, and art and associated international dia-
logues between scholars. Let me refer here to the journal TRACES, founded
and edited during its first years by Naoki Sakai.9 This journal, published simul-
6 Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, “Was ist ‘Intellectual History’?” Intellectual News, 1 (1996),
17. The entire first issue of Intellectual News is accessible in PDF format through the dictionary
website (http://idih.hab.de); click on “About Intellectual History.”
7 Edoardo Tortarolo, “Intellectual History and Historiography,” Intellectual News, 1 (1996),
18.
8 Nicholas Jardine, “Intellectual History and Philosophy of Science,” Intellectual News, 1
(1996), 33.
9 Traces: A Multilingual Journal of Culture Theory and Translation. Traces 1: Specters of
the West and the Politics, ed. Naoki Sakai and Yukiko Hanawa (2001); Traces 2: Race Panic and
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taneously in Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and English, has a subtitle, “A multi-
lingual journal of cultural theory and translation” which clearly indicates a
scope broader than intellectual history including features of culture and prob-
lems of translation.
This new pragmatic attention to what actually happened intellectually, rather
than being limited only to ideas and doctrines, is in my view the most innova-
tive character of intellectual history today, which indeed makes intellectual
history a discipline in its own right. Donald R. Kelley states a similar point
when he says: “Intellectual history has its own aims, values, and questions to
pose about the human condition; and these cannot ultimately be honored and
pursued on the level of theory, which, distracted by the conversations of neigh-
boring disciplines, tends to neglect the practical problems of its own historical
craft.”10 Kelley raises the question of the self-awareness of the intellectual his-
torian. He is, by virtue of the major studies, especially The Descent of Ideas
(2002), best suited to remind us of the tradition we have, even in our attempts
of denying it.
The small sample of quotes I have given indicates why leaving the narrow
borders of traditional historical investigations behind, opening up new theaters
of historical inquiry, and turning to the practical side of things in the realm of
ideas constitute in fact an articulation of a new historical concept, a new method
of historical understanding. Intellectual History has become not just a new
method alongside cultural or social history or a new ideology alongside posi-
tivism or structuralism but a new field of historiographical experience. We
write intellectual history not only because we want to produce more facts and
give more truthful pictures of past things but also because we want to probe
into the intellectual past which we know shaped our world as it is today.
Defining an Intellectual Historian
Intellectual history is a dynamic discipline not easily given to exclusive
characterization, all the more so because during the twentieth century it has
become a global activity. On the other hand a dictionary must proceed to some
sort of definition, since it is designed to inform us about the interdisciplinary
and international intellectual history we see today.
The editor’s point of view must be as generous as possible towards the
different disciplines out of which intellectual histories are written and also to
the many cultures from which intellectual historians come. At the same time
Memory of Migration, ed. Meaghan Morris and Brett de Bary (2001); Traces 3: Impacts of
Modernities, ed. Thomas Lamarre and Kang Nae-hui (2004).
10 Donald R. Kelley, “What is Happening to the History of Ideas?” Intellectual News, 1
(1996), 50; first published in JHI, 51 (1990), 3-25.
150 Ulrich Johannes Schneider
some sort of comparability between the historians chosen for inclusion in the
database must be established.
After months and even years of deliberation we have established three main
criteria for our choice of entries, three conditions which, when not met, almost
automatically exclude the proposed entry. In the end, the International Dictio-
nary of Intellectual Historians (IDIH) will include 1000 of the most important
writers in the field. 1) Each historian included must have produced a major
work no earlier than 1900 and no later than 1970. This is the first criterion.
2) To qualify as intellectual history by the definition used here, the works
must be broad in scope, not focused on a single intellectual figure, and in a
broad sense be narrative, dealing with development over time. This is the sec-
ond criterion. The IDIH is designed to include those writers who offer the most
profound reflection on large movements, the interaction of thought and cir-
cumstance. 3) Our third criterion is this: writers chosen for inclusion must have
been, or still be, influential on subsequent work: we do not seek to judge the
excellence of their work, but only its impact. It is by applying these criteria that
we have selected out of over 2000 proposed entries 800 names which you can
search in the database. These names have been suggested either by individual
scholars, mostly from within our society, or have come from existing dictionar-
ies.
1) From the start of the whole project it was clear that we had to have a
clearly defined period, just in terms of the size of the dictionary. We chose the
twentieth century from 1900 to 1970, the early limit 1900 being the point be-
yond which it becomes increasingly problematic to identify the practice of
writing intellectual history. A major reason to start with the year 1900 is that
academic culture expanded and universities were established everywhere in
the first half of the twentieth century. There were 1200 universities at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, and 16,000 at its end, including 300 full uni-
versities around the year 1900 and 800 around the year 2000. This expansion
took place not just in Europe and North America but all over the world. For
example, universities were founded in 1898 in Bejing and in 1912 in Hong
Kong, and in 1940 there were already close to 45 universities in Japan. Two
Muslim universities were created in India between 1916 and 1920, along with
twenty technical universities. There was an African university in Sudan as early
as 1912; American universities were founded in Cairo 1919 and in Beirut 1924.
Over time this academic development also had its effect on the literary produc-
tion of intellectual history.
The year 1900 does not of course in itself signify an important date in the
history of intellectual history writing. The history of philosophy, the history of
science, literature, religions, and the arts certainly have longer traditions which
predate 1900, sometimes by many centuries. Since, following the warning of
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Anthony Pagden, the broadening of disciplinary histories can turn them into
intellectual histories, I think one should not go back further than 1900 for the
basis of an international and interdisciplinary dictionary.
In making this decision we also include the time when two world wars
unsettled academic and scientific communities on a global scale. Occupation
and emigration forcefully internationalized intellectual history—and I say this
in full knowledge of the fact that many scholars were killed in the war and by
the police. However, emigration also intensified the transfer of ideas and knowl-
edge, and it helped to foster international communication and interdisciplinary
understanding.
The other limit of 1970 is set to allow time for impact to become visible.
The scientific advisory committee is there to further agreement on this delicate
point. The limit of 1970 is also meant to exclude living historians as far as
possible, since the question of their inclusion or exclusion could easily cause
dissent within the group of dictionary authors and advisors. However, among
the 800 included now we have around one hundred still living. (Being an intel-
lectual historian seems to help one get old.)
2) The second criterion is the work itself. For every author included there
is a list of “main works,” which should include an original book, a master
narrative which sketches the picture of a whole period—for example, central
ideas in humanism, main problems of romanticism, etc. Our dictionary is about
intellectual history as a practice. We do not want to include authors whose
work on the reconstruction of past periods is limited to a single study. For
example, Theodor Adorno: although his book, Dialectics of Enlightenment,
written together with Max Horkheimer, can be regarded as a thesis in intellec-
tual history, I do not think that Adorno qualifies for our dictionary because he
did not provide a major narrative, notwithstanding his essays on the history of
literature, of philosophy, and of music.
On the other hand we include Max Horkheimer, because his work on phi-
losophy is always also a history of philosophy and had repercussions in that
discipline. There is a thin line between advancing ideas about what intellectual
history is on the one hand, including studies like Martin Heidegger’s on Leibniz
and Kant, and on the other hand actually working as an intellectual historian
with research in libraries, archives, and all that. Ernst Cassirer for example
produced many systematic studies, yet it is because he wrote an influential
multi-volume work on the history of epistemology that gains him entry into our
dictionary.
The requirement of a historical work, a book truly worked up from the
sources, is vital for a dictionary which exhibits ideas as part of complex histori-
cal situations, embedded not only in theories but in ways of thinking and meth-
ods of reasoning. Hence not everybody concerned with the intellectual past is a
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possible entry for us. This has to do not so much with quality but with the
historical narrative as a form. We need to distinguish our authors by major
book-length contributions to intellectual history, its periods and problems, its
ideas and methods, etc. Of course there is no easy way, and there are excep-
tions, such as Arnaldo Momigliano, the Italian historian of humanism and of
the history of classical philology. We have put together a list full of problem-
atic cases, which is available on the internet, because we certainly need a sec-
ond opinion. Once we start working on the articles themselves, our organiza-
tional structure with a board of consultants and a scientific advisory committee
will also come into play.
It is important to note that the criterion of historical narrative serves to
exclude a whole variety of works by scholars whom I want to call, for lack of
any other more specific term, commentators, i.e., authors who specialize in
certain subjects but never get beyond their area of specialization. Think of the
countless studies on Michelangelo, on Voltaire, or on Beethoven. It would give
the cultures rich in universities an unfair advantage, if we were to include ev-
ery author who produced a dissertation on such subjects. The number of theses
published on Descartes is too high, as is the number of books on Kant or Hegel.
3) The third and last criterion is impact, through which we also exclude
many of the commentators just mentioned. We want to include authors who
had an impact through their books, translations thereof, and reviews, etc. Only
exceptionally will we include authors whose impact was secured through teach-
ing alone—especially some East European authors who, in the period up to
1990, had no chance to publish. We insist on impact because we want to ex-
clude textbook authors who keep to standard knowledge. Similarly, however,
we will not be able to avoid ideologically influential work. Here is a quote
from the Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing, published in 1998: “We
are apt to dismiss, from a liberal present, the notion that history ought to be
ideologically driven; nevertheless, it is a fact that history has always been in-
fluenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by external forces operating on the his-
torian....”11 Our dictionary will not deny these forces, but name them as clearly
as possible.
When it comes to impact, the editors are in urgent need of help from the
committees. There must be ways to come to some agreement among a majority
of specialists about whether to include certain historians or not, when taking all
the relevant data into consideration. With respect to this criterion, conferences
will also play an important role, since the project is not only international and
interdisciplinary in content but also by virtue of the very process by which it
11 A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing, ed. D. R. Woolf (London, 1998), introduc-
tion.
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will be produced, namely, extensive communication within the international
scientific community.
For each historian the dictionary article will offer a range of useful infor-
mation. There will be a head entry with basic biographical data (including, if
applicable, cross references to other biographical dictionaries), followed by a
selective bibliography. The article itself includes a short biography stressing
education, career, and geographical movements; a characterization of the
historian’s work; a section on method, which often brings out relations to other
intellectual historians; and finally impact, discussing the influence of the histo-
rian on subsequent tradition. Hence, in a short space, the reader will see why
the historian is significant, how he or she relates to others in the field, and
where to look for further information.
Every article places modern intellectual historians in their professional and
intellectual contexts, as can be seen, for example, from the sample articles
available on the dictionary web page. The article on Japanese historian Masao
Maruyama, for instance, tells us in the biographical section that Maruyama
was the first holder of the chair in history of political ideas at Tokyo Imperial
University. The German historian of science Anneliese Maier argued with the
theories of French scholar Pierre Duhem: the terms of the disagreement appear
in the section which characterizes her work. The article on French philosopher
and historian Michel Foucault includes a section on method which discusses
the vexed question of his relation to structuralism. Those unfamiliar with the
Senegalese intellectual Cheikh Anta Diop may read about his influence on Afro-
centric movements in America and the Caribbean in the section on impact.
The articles are medium-length (roughly two pages or four columns) for
well-known figures as much as for less famous historians. We do not want to
have “classes” of entries in the same way as the Biographical Dictionary of
Twentieth-Century Philosophers, published in 1996, which indicates by the
varying length “the importance of the figures concerned.”12 In our dictionary
we give a list of reference works for those rather well-known historians in-
cluded in dictionaries elsewhere. We do not attempt to assess historiographical
achievement on a global scale; rather we want to inform about the overall di-
versity of historiographical modes in intellectual history. The dictionary will
supply a starting point for the reader who wishes to relate historians to other
thinkers from widely varying disciplines and distant places. We will deal with
historians from all over the world, and must reach readers equally widely. I am
confident that our dictionary will contain, in the end, many names not to be
found in other printed or online reference works.
12 Biographical Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Philosophers, ed. Stuart Brown (London,
1996), introduction.
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A New Republic of Letters?
The dictionary project addresses the problems of the new globalized world
in three ways. One is to build the resources for understanding intellectual his-
tory. At present, we lack even a reference list of important intellectual histori-
ans that carries the approval of a wide range of scholars. We propose to publish
our dictionary of intellectual historians to provide direction for future research.
The second is a series of conferences that will bring scholars from many ori-
gins together to engage in a dialogue and produce collaborative publications in
conference proceedings. Simultaneously, we will use the impetus of the con-
ferences to build a network across the world, communicating through e-mail
lists and websites, to build a network of experts in the field. We are conscious
that we need scholars from all parts of the world, including those for whom
regular access to the internet is difficult.
The dictionary provides an effective tool for understanding the ways in
which intellectual histories are written, in which conceptions of the world are
molded. There is demand for international and interdisciplinary commerce of
ideas about the globalized world. The dictionary project is an invitation to
build this knowledge in co-operation with scholars from all over the world,
effectively using European resources to de-Europeanize the basis for advanced
mutual understanding. Once the basic biographies and bibliographies are avail-
able, it will become possible to discuss the impact of political, aesthetic, and
religious thought on mentalities and on the formation of the human being in
our age.13
Herzog August Bibliothek.
13 This text was printed in a slightly different version in Intellectual News, 14 (2004), 9-15.
